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[So F. No. 18996. In Bank. Sept. 23, 1955.] 
DIXIE GILMORE, an Incompetent Person, etc., Appellant, 
v. DON GILMORE, Respondent. 
[1] Divorce-Extreme Cruelty-Evidence.-On a husband's cross-
complaint for divorce alleging extreme cruelty, his admitted 
indifference to accepted standards of normal sexual behn vior 
and his opinion that intoxicated persons have no moral re-
sponsibility were insufficient to compel the trial court to con-
clude as a matter of law that the wife's continuous course ot 
misconduct did not constitute extreme cruelty toward him. 
[2] Id.-Extreme Cruelty-Evidence.-The evidence and finding 
in a divorce case that the husband was not guilty of cruelty 
toward his wife, but on the whole was kind and considerate of 
her and for many years was patient with her excessive drink-
ing, buying her expensive gifts, taking her on extended trips 
and purchasing expensive homes in an effort to save the mar-
riage, refute the wife's contention that he was so depraved 
as to be incapable of suffering from her conduct. 
[3] Id.-Condonation-Evidence.-The wife in a divorce case 
could not successfully assert that the evidence demonstrated 
that her husband had condoned all of her alleged offenses 
except those that occurred in the last several months that they 
lived together, where condonation was not pleaded by her as 
a defense, where there was no evidence of an express agree-
ment to condone, and where, even if condonation had been 
established with respect to her earlier misconduct, it would 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Divorce, § 25; [3] Divorce, § 62; 
[4,5] Divorce, §60; [6-8] Divorce, §198; [9-11] Husband and 
Wife, § 68; [12] Divolce, § 219; [13] Divorce, § 137. 
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have been revoked by her subsequent miseonduct that was ad-
mittedly not condoned. (Civ. Code, §§ 118, 121.) 
[4] ld.-Recrimination.-When each of the parties has given the 
other grounds for divorce, the eourt may grant a divorce to 
both, and it is clothed with a broad discretion to advance 
the requirements of justice in each particular case. 
[5] ld.-Recrimination.-The comparative guilt of the parties to 
a divorce action may have an important bearing on whether 
or not either one or both should be granted relief. 
[6] ld.-Permanent Alimony.-When a divorce is granted to both 
parties, alimony may be awarded to either, since the basis 
of liability for alimony is the granting of a divorce against 
the person required to pay it. (Civ. Code, § 139.) 
[7] ld. - Permanent Alimony. - The comparative guilt of the 
parties to a divorce action is only one factor in determining 
whether alimony should be awarded; the needs of the wife and 
the ability of the husband to provide for her are also im-
portant, and in any particular case adultery mayor may not 
constitute greater fault than that of the other party. 
[8] ld.-Permanent Alimony.-In a divorce case it was not an 
abuse of discretion to deny the wife a divorce and alimony, 
though the trial court in granting the husband a divorce orally 
expressed the view that the parties were in pari delicto par-
ticularly with regare' to sexual irregularities, where the hus-
band's adultery did not occur until after the marriage had 
failed and the parties separated, and where the wife was in-
different to her husband, had pursued a continuous course 
of cruel conduct toward him, had disregarded accepted stand-
ards of sexual behavior and thus, before she finally left him 
and instituted the divorce action, had forfeited her right to 
alimony. 
[9] Husband and Wife - Oommunity and Separate Property-
Profits of Husband's Busir.ess.-Where the husband is operat-
ing a business which is his separate property, income from 
such business is allocated to community or separate property 
in ;lccordance with the extent to which it is allocable to the 
husband's efforts or his capital investment. 
[5] P.ecrimination as an absolute or qualified defense in divorce 
eases, note, 170 A.L.R. 1076. See also Oal.Jur.2d, Divorce and 
Separation, § 61; Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 233. 
[6] Allowance of permanent alimony to wife against whom 
divorce is granted, note, 34 A.L.R.2d 313. See also OaJ.Jur.2d, 
Divorce and Separation, § 201 et seq.; Am.Jur., Divorce alid Sep-
aration, § 586 et seq. 
[9] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Community Property, i 22; Am.Jur .. eo.-
munity Property. § 33. • _ _ '.. _, . _ . , 
\ 
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[10] Id. - Community and Separate Property - Profits of Bus· 
band's Business.-A proper method of making an allocation of 
income from a business which is the husband's separate prop· 
erty is to deduct from the total earnings of the business the 
o. 
value of the husband's servi8es to it; the remainder, if any, 
represents the earnings attributable to the separate property 
invested in the business. 
[11] Id. - Community an.d Separate Property - Profits of Hus-
band's Business.-The rule that the proper m3thod for de-
termining what part of the increase in value of a husband's 
separate business was community property is to subtract from 
the total increase a reasonable return on the value at the 
time of the marriage and treat the remainder as community 
property may be applied only in the absence of circumstances 
showing a different result, and may not be applied where the 
husband can prove that a larger return on his capital had 
in fact been realized. 
[12] Divorce-Disposition of Property-Jurisdiction Over Prop-
erty Rights.-Where the evidence in a divorce case supports 
the trial court's finding that property was held in joint tenancy, 
the court, in the absence of an award of alimony, has no 
authority to assign the husband's separate property to the 
wife by requiring him to use it to protect her property in-
terests. 
[13] Id.-Appeal-Grounds for Reversal.-A judgment denying 
the wife a divorce and awarding one to the husband on his 
eross-complaint will not be reversed on the ground that, ap-
proximately eight months after the termination of the trial 
she was adjudicated an incompetent and her father was ap-
pointed her guardian, where she was represented by able 
eounsel and was observed at the trial, which lasted approxi-
mately one month, by the court and counsel, and where she 
was examined by a psychiatrist, whose testimony she offered 
with respect to the effect of the husband's alleged cruelty on 
her, and such testimony contained no suggestion that she was 
mentally incapable of participating in the trial. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin 
County. Jordan L. Martinelli, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for divorce, in which defendant filed a cross-com-
plaint for similar relief. Judgment for defendant on cross-
complaint, affirmed. 
James Martin MacInnis and Nicholas Alaga for Appellant. 
Michael L. Haun, Myers &I Meehan and .Wa.llilcQ S. M3era 
for Respondent. - ------
) 
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THA YNOR, J.-Plaintiff and defendant were married in 
1946 and lived together for approximately six years before 
this action for divorce was filed-in 1952. There were no chil-
dren of the marriage. "In her amended and supplemental 
complaint plaintiff alleged that defendant was guilty of 
extreme cruelty, desertion, and adultery. Defendant answered 
and cross-complained alleging extreme cruelty. The trial 
court awarded defendant an interlocutory decree of divorce 
based on findings of extreme cruelty. It also found that 
defendant had not been guilty of cruelty or desertion, that 
there was no community property, that specified real and 
personal property belonged to the parties as joint tenants, and 
that the remainder of the property claimed to be community 
was the separate property of defendant or a corporation 
owned by him. With respect to plaintiff's allegations of 
defendant's adultery, the court found that the allegations 
thereof were untrue, "save and except-that it is true that 
during the period between the first day of June, 1952 and the 
20th day of June, 1952, the defendant herein indulged in at 
least six acts of sexual intercourse with women not his wife, 
in the City and County of San Francisco, State of California; 
that none of said acts of sexual intercourse constituted ex-
treme cruelty toward plaintiff; that none of said acts of sexual 
intercourse caused plaintiff herein any mental pain or suffer-
ing, and each and all of said acts were committed subsequent 
to the filing of the . • . action." Plaintiff appeals. 
Plaintiff contends that defendant's own testimony estab-
lishes that her conduct could not have constituted extreme 
cruelty toward him. She bases this contention on the 
fact that defendant was not disturbed by alleged sexual irregu-
larities involving himself, plaintiff, and another woman, and 
on his testimony with respect to his attitude toward drinking 
that "Well, when you are tight, I don't think you have any 
moral responsibility." There is substantial evidence, however, 
to support the finding of the trial court that "for the period 
of more than four years last past next immediately preceding 
the commencement of the above-entitled action, plaintiff has 
wilfully and wrongfully treated defendant in a cruel and 
inhuman manner, and in utter disregard and in violation of 
her marital duties and obligations toward defendant, anp has 
caused defendant great and grievous mental pain and suffer-
ing without cause or provocation therefor; that on numerous 
occasions in the presence of defendant and other persons, 
plaintiff has wrongfully called defendant vile and opprobrious 
) 
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names, causing defendant s11ame and humiliation thereby; that 
for more than four years last past the plaintiff has wilfully 
and without good cause failed to exhibit any love or affection 
toward defendant, that during the period of the last four 
years the said plaintiff has drunk intoxicating liquor to excess; 
and on numerous occasions, while under the influence of 
liquor, has quarreled and nagged at defendant and called him 
vile names, in the presence of other persons, without justi. 
fication or cause, that for more than three years last past the 
plaintiff has wilfully, wrongfully and without good cause 
refused the defendant reasonable, or any, matrimonial sexual 
intercourse; [and] that said plaintiff has, on numerous occa-
sions during the marriage, without cause, wrongfully and 
violently struck said defendant, causing him shame, humilia-
tion, embarrassment and grievous and great mental pain and 
suffering. " 
[1] We do not believe that defendant's admitted indiffer-
ence to accepted standards of normal sexual behavior and 
his opinion that intoxicated persons have no moral responsi-
bility were sufficient as a matter of law to compel the trial 
court to conclude that plaintiff's continuous course of mis-
conduct did not constitute extreme cruelty toward him. Thus, 
that defendant might in the privacy of his own home engage 
in or observe abnormal sexual activities without moral 
qualms," or consider intoxication a release from moral respon-
sibility, does not necessarily establish that he was insensitive 
to public humiliation, physical attacks, and the denial of 
marital rights. [2] Moreover, the evidence and finding that 
defendant was not guilty of cruelty toward plaintiff refute 
plaintiff's contention that he was so depraved as to be in-
capable of suffering from his wife's conduct. On the whole 
defendant was kind and considerate of plaintiff. Although 
on two occasions he slapped her and on others called her names, 
these incidents were trivial in comparison to similar conduct 
of plaintiff's and were probably provoked by her. For many 
years defendant was patient with plaintiff's excessive drink-
·The issue of abnormal sexual behavior was introduced into the case 
by plaintiff's testimony that the marriage failed owing to defendant's 
constant reiteration of ' , revolting sexual suggestions" to her. She denied 
that she had ever engaged in any abnormal sex practices. To refute this 
testimony defendant testified that plaintiff had been a willing participant 
in abnormal sex acts with another woman and that he had been a 
"glorified observer." Defendant's testimony was corroborated by that 
of the other woman. Although the trial court made no finding with 
respect to this issue, it stated in its oral opi.nion that it thought the 
parties were in pari delicto with respect to it. 
) 
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ing, and he came home from bis business early in the after-
noons and stayed with her almost every evening because she 
did not like to be left alone. H.e bought her many expensive 
gifts, took her on extended trips, and purchased two expensive 
homes in an effort to save the marriage. 
[3] Plaintiff contends, however, that the evidence demon-
strates that defendant condoned all of her alleged offenses 
except those that occurred in the last several months that the 
parties lived together. There is no merit in this contention. 
Condonation was not pleaded by plaintiff as a defense and the 
evidence was not such as to compel a finding that it had been 
established. (See Hamburger v. Hamburger, 60 Cal.App.2d 
530, 536-537 [141 P.2d 453].) Section 118 of the Civil Code 
provides that "Where the cause of divorce consists of a course 
of offensive conduct, or arises, in cases of cruelty, from exces-
sive acts of ill-treatment which may, aggregately, constitute 
the offense, cohabitation, or passive endurance, or conjugal 
kindness, shall not be evidence of condonation of any of the 
acts constituting such cause, unless accompanied by an express 
agreement to condone." There is no evidence of an ex-
press agreement to condone, and even had condonation been 
established with respect to plaintiff's earlier misconduct it 
would have been revoked by her subsequent similar misconduct 
that was admittedly not condoned. (Civ. Code, § 121.) 
Plaintiff contends that even on the basis of the facts 
found by the trial court a divorce should have been granted 
to both of the parties so that alimony could be awarded tt) 
her. (See Mueller v. Mueller, 44 Cal.2d 527 [282 P.2d 869].) 
Since the trial court found on substantial evidence that defend-
ant was not guilty of cruelty or desertion, it could only have 
awarded plaintiff a divorce on the ground of defendant '8 
adultery committed after the action was commenced and 
pleaded for the first time in plaintiff's supplemental complaint. 
Defendant contends that adultery committed after the filing 
of the action is not a ground for divorce, and that, in any 
event, relief could not be predicated on a supplemental com-
plaint once it had been determined that plaintiff had no cause 
of action under the allegations of her original complaint. (See 
Imperial Land 00. v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 173 Cal. 668, 673 
[161 P. 116, 119].) Plaintiff contends, on the other hand, 
that defendant's adultery may properly be relied upo"n by 
her regardless of when it occurred or how it was pleaded 
and that the trial court erroneously accepted defendant 'a 
view that his adultery could not be considered. 
,) 
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Since we have concluded that the trial court fully consid-
ered and disposed of the issue of defendant's adultery and 
did not abuse its dbcretion by denying plaintiff a divorce, it is 
unnecessary to decide whether the judgment could also be 
sustained on the grounds urged by defendant above. 
"The supplemental complaint was permitted to be filed 
over defendant's objection, his motion to strike the evidence 
supporting its allegations was denied, and the trial court 
expressly found that the allegations of some 10 to 14 acts of 
adultery were untrue except that "it is true that ••• defend-
ant herein indulged in at least six acts of sexual intercourse 
with women not his wife" while he was married to defendant. 
It thus appears that the trial court considered the allegations 
and evidence of adultery and made a finding that defendant 
was guilty thereof. 
[4] The applicable rule in this situation was recently 
restated in Mueller v. Mueller, 44 Ca1.2d 527, 530 [282 P.2d 
869] . "When each of the parties has given the other grounds 
for divorce, the court may grant a divorce to both, and it 'is 
clothed with a broad discretion to advance the requirements 
of justice in each particular case.' (5, 6] The comparative 
guilt of the parties 'may have an important bearing upon 
whether or not either one or both should be granted relief,' 
and when 'a divorce is granted to both, alimony may be 
awarded to either, for the basis of liability foJ;' alimony is the 
granting of a divorce against the person required to pay it. 
(See Civ. Code, § 139.)' (De Burgh v. De Burgh, supra, 39 
Ca1.2d 858, 872-874 .••• )" [7] It was also pointed out 
that the comparative guilt of the parties "is only one factor 
in determining whether alimony should be awarded and that 
the needs of the life and the ability of the husband to provide 
for her are also important," and that in "any particular 
case adultery mayor may not constitute greater fault than 
that of the other party." (44 Cal.2d at 530, 532.) In that 
case the court affirmed an award of alimony to a wife found 
guilty of adultery on the ground that no abuse of discretion 
was shown. 
[8] In the present case, on the other hand, the trial court 
concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to a divorce or ali-
mony. In doing so it was necessary for it to weigh the 
conflicting charges of sexual abnormality, none of which were 
established as grounds for relief, plaintiff's continuous course 
of cruel conduct toward defendant, defendant's lack of cruelty 
toward plaintiff, defendant's adultery, plaintiff's need for 
8uppo~t, and defendant 'a ability to provide it. Although 
:) 
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in its oral opinion the trial court expressed tIle view 
that the parties were in pm'i delicto, particularly with regard 
to sexual irregularities, the fipdings, which are controlling, 
and the judgment based thereon reflect thc ultimate determi-
nation that plaintiff's cruelty justified the denial of relief 
to her. Although this determination may seem harsh, it 
should be noted that had defendant not committed adultery 
after the marriage had failed and the parties separated, on 
the basis of its findings, the trial court could have reached 
no other conclusion. In other words, before plaintiff finally 
left defendant and instituted this action she had forfeited her 
right to alimony. In the light of plaintiff's indifference 
to her husband, her continuous course of cruel conduct 
toward him, and the evidence of her own disregard of accepted 
standards of sexual behavior, we cannot say that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying her relief or hold as a 
matter of law that defendant's adultery occurring after the 
failure of the marriage compelled the reinstatement of plain-
tiff's right to alimony. 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in :finding that 
there was no community property. She bases this contention 
on the fact that during the marriage defendant's net worth 
representing his interests in three incorporated automobile 
dealerships increased from $182,010.46 to $786,045.52. During 
this period defendant received salaries from his dealerships 
ranging from a total of $22,250 in 1946 to a total of $66,799.92 
in 1952. The trial court found that the salaries paid defend-
ant by the corporations for his services "rendered to and on 
behalf of said corporations during the married life of the 
parties hereto, were and are sufficient to fully compensate 
said defendant and the community for all of the services 
rendered to and on behalf of said corporations by defendant 
during said period of marriage, all of which said salaries 
have been used and expended for community purposes during 
said marriage." [9] In Huber v. Huber, 27 Ca1.2d 784, 
792 [167 P .2d 708], the court stated that "In regard to earn-
ings, the rule is that where the husband is operating a business 
which is his separate property, income from such business is 
allocated to community or separate property in accordance 
with the extent to which it is aUocalf..e to the husband 's ~fforts 
or his capital investment." [10] It has frequently been 
held that a proper method of making such allocation is to 
deduct from the total earnings of the businE'ss the value of 
the husband's services "to it. The remainder, if &ll1", represents 
) 
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the earnings attributable to the separate property invested in 
the business. (llarrold v. Harrold, 43 Ca1.2d 77, 79-81 [271 
P.2d 489]; Huber v. Huber, supra, 27 Ca1.2d 784, 792; 
Logan v. Forster, 114 Cal.App.2d 587, 599-601 [250 P.2d 
730] ; Cozzi v. Oozzi, 81 Cal.App.2d 229, 232-233 [183 P.2d 
739'] ; Seligman v. Seligman, 85 Cal.App. 683, 687 [259 P. 
984] .) This method was followed by the trial court in 
this case, and the evidence sustains its findings. Defendant's 
corporations were staffed by well trained personnel who were 
capable of carrying on the businesses unassisted. Defendant 
worked relatively short hours and took many extended vaca-
tions. There was expert testimony that the salaries he re-
eeived, which were found to constitute community income, 
were more than ample compensation for the services he 
rendered. Moreover, during the period involved there was a 
tremendous increase in automobile business that was accom-
panied by an increase in the value of dealer franchises. 
[11] Plaintiff contends, however, that the proper method 
for determining what part of the increase in value of the 
businesses was community property is to subtract from the 
total increase a reasonable return on the value at the time 
of the marriage and treat the remainder as community prop-
erty. She relies on Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 7 [103 P. 
488, 134 Am.St.Hep. 107, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 880], in which the 
court stated: "In the absence of circumstances showing a 
different result, it is to be presumed that some of the profits 
were justly due to the capital invested. There is nothing to 
show that all of it was due to defendant's efforts alone. The 
probable contribution of the capital to the income should have 
been determined from the circumstances of the case, and as 
the business was profitable it would amount at least to the 
usual interest on a long investment well secured." If this 
method were followed in the present case it would be neces-
sary to allocate to the community a large part of the increase 
in defendant's net worth during the marriage. The rule 
of the Pereira case is not, however, in conflict with the rule 
of the cases cited above and followed by th.e trial court in 
this case. It is to be applied only" In the absence of circum-
stances showing a different result," and the court clearly 
recognized that if the husband could prove that a larger return 
on his capital had in faet been realized the allocation should 
be made differently. (156 Cal. at 11-12.) In the present 
case defendant introduced substantial evidence that the 
salaries he received were a proper measure of the community 
interes,t in the earnings of the businesses, and the trial court'i 
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finding based thereon cannot be disturbed on appeal. (HmTold 
v. Harrold, supra, 43 Ca1.2d 77, 80-81; Gudclj v. Gudclj, 41 
Cal.2d 202, 211 [259 P.2d 656].} 
[12] Plaintiff contends that the court deprived her of 
any real interest in the property found to be held in joint 
tenancy by failing to require defendant to protect the prop-
erty against foreclosure and sale for nonpayment of the 
encumbrances thereon. She contends that such protection 
could have been afforded had it been found that the property 
was community, and that in any event, some provision should 
have been made to protect her interest. The evidence, how-
ever, supports the trial court's finding that the property was 
held in joint tenancy, and in the absence of an award of 
alimony the trial court had no authority to assign defendant's 
separate property to plaintiff by requiring him to use it to 
protect plaintiff's property interests. (Fox v. Fox, 18 Cal.2d 
645, 646 [117 P.2d 325]; see Huber v. Huber, supra, 27 
Ca1.2d 784, 793, and cases cited; Citizens Nat. Trust &- Sav. 
Bank v. Hawkins, 87 Cal.App.2d 535, 542 [197 P.2d 385].) 
[13] Approximately eight months after the termination of 
the trial plaintiff was adjudicated an incompetent, and her 
father was appointed her guardian. She now contends that 
her "now-recogni7ed lack of mental competency pervaded 
her entire participation in the trial," and that therefore the 
judgment should be reversed. Plaintiff was represented by 
able counsel and was observed at the trial, which lasted 
approximately one month, by the court and counsel. More-
over, she was examined by a psychiatrist whose testimony she 
offered with respect to the effect of defendant's alleged cruelty 
on her, and his testimony contains no suggestion that she was 
mentally incapable of participating in the trial. In the light 
of the foregoing considerations it is clear that the record fails 
to establish that her present incompetency existed at the time 
of the trial and prevented her from fairly presenting her case. 
Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in admitting and excluding evidence. We 
have considered her contentions with respect to the questioned 
rulings and have concluded that even if they were erroneoUB 
no prejudicial error has been shown. 
The judgment is affirmed.. 
-. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schaner, J., eon(!Urroo. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J .. concw.'l'ed in the 
judgment. _ . __ ' . _-. 
